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INTRODUCTION 
As part of Ontario's "Who Does What" (WDW) and Local Services Realignment (LSR) 
initiatives, key elements for funding and control of the province's ambulance services 
were devolved to Upper Tier Municipalities (UTMs) and Designated Delivery Agents 
(DDAs) beginning in 1998. Devolution is defined as the transfer or delegation of power 
to a lower level, especially by cental governments to local or regional administration1. 
This differs somewhat from the definition of downloading, i.e., to shift or relegate 
responsibilities or costs for a program from one level of government to a lower one2. 
Regardless, the provincial government insisted that the LSR process was not about 
squeezing budgets, but rather about more efficient government using best practices to 
save money for the taxpayer, while sorting out which level of government could best 
deliver a particular service3. Their stated goal was more accountable, less costly and 
simplified government4. 
1 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Pg. 506 
2 The Canadian Oxford Dictionary. Interestingly, a reference to downloading otlicr than in the computer 
sense, cannot even be found in the New Oxford Dictionary of English. The only definition is found in the Canadian 
Oxford Dictionary where it is noted to be of Canadian origin, with the Harris "download" of social services used as 
an example. 
3 Speaking Notes for Minister Al Leach - Association of Counties and Regions Conference, Sudbury, 
October 6, 1997, Pg. 5 
4 "Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 176 
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This paper has four main objectives: 
• First, to document the process of transition from a provincially micro-managed 
ambulance system to fifty separate and distinct units operating under a common 
set of guiding principles. 
• Second, to compare the levels of service provided and costs incurred at both the 
provincial and municipal levels, pre and post transition. 
Third, to use data from sample municipalities in an attempt to determine 
differences in costs and service levels between municipalities who chose to 
contract for ambulance service rather than deliver it themselves. 
• The paper concludes with a summary of the perceived successes and failures of 
the transition of Ontario's ambulance services, and discusses whether the action 
met the government of the day's objectives for their WDW initiative. 
To best understand the issues involved, it is necessary to begin by reviewing the histoiy 
of this unique public service. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMBULANCE SERVICE IN ONTARIO 
Not unlike other jurisdictions, Ontario's ambulance services have emerged from roots 
embedded in both health care and the private sector, evolving along a somewhat 
convoluted path into the current municipally controlled service delivery models. While 
the first municipally funded hospital ambulance services appeared in Toronto as early as 
1880, and were similarly well established in Berlin-Waterloo by 1903s, Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS) were not municipal priorities in other parts of the province. 
During the first half of the 20th century, it was not uncommon to see private ambulance 
services operating as sidelines for funeral homes, or even furniture stores, taxi and towing 
companies. While some would see providing ambulance service as a serious conflict of 
interest for the funeral director, their involvement was generally borne out of a 
commitment to provide a much needed community service... not to mention that theirs 
was often the only equipment in town capable of comfortably transporting patients lying 
down! The funeral home was already staffed, the telephone answered 24 hours a day, and 
the staffs education in the natural sciences, second only to that of the local physician.6 
In larger communities, a number of commercial ambulance services were often available, 
although no means existed to co-ordinate their efforts. There was no provincial funding 
for ambulance services, payment was on a full fee-for-service basis, and there were no 
uniform standards for patient care, training or equipment.7 No 9-1-1 telephone or 
centralized dispatch systems were yet in place, and a competitive element often affected 
quality of care provided. Unlike today, it was sometimes better to be the last ambulance 
arriving at the scene of a motor vehicle collision, rather than the first and fastest. 
5 A Century of Red Blankets, Pg. 15 
gmrs 6 The 1,100-Year History of the Ambulance, Pg. 49 
7 The Final Report of Uie Emergency Medical Services Review, Pg. 2 
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Arriving ambulances commonly blocked the ambulance ahead to prevent them from 
being able to transport patients. Thus, the last arriving ambulance was the only one 
assured of a paying customer. Despite the competition, there was no guarantee that the 
personnel aboard any of these ambulances were even marginally trained. No standard of 
training was prescribed, and one 1963 study revealed that only 141 of 181 operators 
contacted, even had staff with basic first aid training8. 
During the late 1960s, Dr. Norman McNally, then Director of the Emergency Health 
Services Division (EHS) of the Ontario Hospital Services Commission (forerunner of 
today's Ministry of Health and Long Term Care), was charged with developing "a 
balanced and integrated system of ambulance services..."9 out of a "hodge podge" of 425 
services of widely varying quality that existed around the province. Under his direction, 
EHS set out to first standardize training levels among ambulance attendants, then 
improve vehicles and equipment. McNally's stated goal was eliminating the private 
services, then consolidating them to gain benefits of scale, and placing them under the 
control of hospitals where stable funding, training and quality assurance could be 
maintained.10 Unfortunately, the cost of this worthwhile venture was grossly 
underestimated, and financial limitations negated the government's wholesale purchase of 
all private ambulance services. 
8 A Century of Red Blankets, Pg. 63 
9 Ibid, Pg. 67 
10 The Business of Ambulance Service In Ontario, Pg. 1 
From 1968-1973, licensed ambulance services could not be sold between operators... only 
back to the Ontario Hospital Services Commission (the Ministry of Health after 1971). 
The mid-1970s however, saw a reversal of this trend towards public consolidation, with a 
new emphasis on private sector involvement in the management and delivery of 
ambulance services. From 1973 on, service licenses and assets were bought and sold as 
business undertakings.11 
What remained in place from the 1970s was an ever-evolving mix of approximately 175 
publicly contracted (hospital and municipal), private, and directly operated (OPS) 
ambulance services, that were all fully funded and directed by the Ministry of Health. 
/^^ Some 40% of these services were operated by private individuals/corporations in a unique 
relationship described by the Executive Director of the now defunct Ontario Ambulance 
Operators' Association: 
Beginning with the first Ambulance Act in 1966, private operators and the 
Ontario government entered into a form of public/private partnership. The 
government provided the vehicles and the cash while the operators provided 
business expertise and operational acumen}2 
While the private operators obviously felt they had control over their own businesses and 
the Ministry considered them independent operators, a review of the actual business 
practices indicates otherwise. Ambulance Operators acted in a managerial role rather 
11 The Final Report of the Emergency Medical Services Review, Pg. 3 
12 The Business of Ambulance Service in Ontario, Preface 
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than a traditional "at risk" entrepreneurial business relationship. Micro-management was 
a hallmark of the Ministry-Operator relationship, with every aspect of the operation 
significantly controlled by the Ministry. Operations of the services were managed 
centrally through six Regional offices of the Emergency Health Services Branch. 
Ambulances and major capital equipment were provided at no charge to the Operator, 
while other expenses were detailed in Ministry-approved line-by-line budgets, and then 
cash flowed automatically to the Operator. A system of "one-time" approvals and 
payments was provided for unexpected expenditures. As any expenditure required prior 
Ministry approval before proceeding, there was little if any capital risk to the Operator.13 
During the decade preceding the WDW activities, labour unions strongly lobbied for 
change in the governance of ambulance services that they hoped would lead to service 
improvements, widespread implementation of advanced paramedic skills, and 
standardization of wages. The most significant outcome of their efforts was a 1989 
Labour Relations Tribunal report commonly known as the "McKechnie Report"14 (after 
the Collingwood ambulance operator of the day), in which the Ontario Public Services 
Employees Union (OPSEU) challenged the government's stance that ambulance 
operators were independent businesses. 
13 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pgs. 3-4 
14 Ontario Public Service Labour Relations Tribunal between OPSEU and the Crown, in the Right of 
Ontario (MOH) and McKechnie Ambulance Service Inc. 
The Tribunal concluded: 
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that the ambulance service provided by McKechnie Ambulance is the Ministry's 
business. Virtually every significant and tiny aspect of the business is tightly 
controlled by the Ministry. There is virtually nothing of substance left for 
McKechnie Ambulance to decide. There is virtually no room for independent 
discretion. 
They decided that on the basis of perspective of control, ownership of tools, and chance 
of profit and risk of loss, that the Province was actually the Employer. They further 
designated McKechnie Ambulance as an Agent of the Crown, and its employees as 
Crown employees for bargaining purposes. The McKechnie decision ultimately resulted 
in the similar designation of some 97 ambulance operators and their employees through 
1995's Public Service Act Regulation 57/95. The initial result of this decision was first 
time central bargaining and wages matching their Ontario Public Service (OPS) 
counterparts, for many of the private ambulance operators and their employees. 
Despite two major reviews of EMS governance and structure, this rather eclectic mix of 
"private", hospital, municipal and OPS ambulance services remained in place until the 
Local Services Realignment initiative of the Harris era. Interestingly, in The Final Report 
of the Emergency Medical Services Review commissioned by the Ministry of Health in 
1991, the Review's Chair, Professor Gene Swimmer, unknowingly predicted the decision 
11 
that would have to be made seven years in the future as part of WDW: 
/ think that the public (all provincial employees and state assets - author's 
clarification) and municipal models, identified as having the most positive 
aspects, are of equal merit. It is probably true that a public model will 
provide a higher minimum standard of service across the province, at a 
potentially higher cost. Other than that the major point of comparison 
seems to be the organizational model itself, involving a decision on whether 
emergency health services should be provided by the provincial government 
or devolved to the municipal level.l5 
THE HARRIS "WHO DOES WHAT" INITIATIVE 
This section is not intended as a comprehensive review of the Harris government's efforts 
at provincial-municipal disentanglement, but rather will summarize the WDW elements 
that directly affected realignment of ambulance services in the province.16 
Under Harris, Ontario's Progressive Conservatives with their "Common Sense 
Revolution" manifesto, won a resounding victory in the 1995 provincial election. Four 
key themes made up this Common Sense Revolution platform: Less and Simpler 
Government reducing waste and overlap between levels of government (as well as 
reducing involvement of the provincial government in direct service delivery); a Fiscal 
Focus on attacking the provincial deficit and cutting provincial income taxes; and a 
15 Final Report of the Emergency Medical Services Review, Pg. 19 
16 For a comprehensive review of the entire process including prescription of the Toronto megacity, refer 
to the Graham and Phillips' article: "IVJto Does Wliat" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal 
disentanglement 
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Competitiveness Agenda promoting a leaner, simpler and fiscally tight-fisted government 
that would once again have Ontario "open for business".17 
Having sensed that their "Common Sense Revolution" had struck a sympathetic chord 
with the electorate, the Harris Government moved decisively and immediately upon 
taking office. Massive budget cuts and the initiation of major restructuring across the 
education, health and municipal fields were packaged together so as not to attract undue 
attention to any one specific effort. In their paper, Graham and Phillips describe the 
Harris government as wanting to "reshape their core business and simplify and reduce the 
entire public sector".18 
The resulting Omnibus Bill 26 (the Ontario Savings ami Restructuring Act) led to the 
May 1996 appointment of the "Who Does What" Panel, chaired by well respected former 
Toronto Mayor and MP David Crombie. The Panel was empowered to make 
recommendations on how best to overhaul funding and delivery of a wide range of 
government services at both the provincial and municipal levels, with the overall goal 
being the reduction of waste, duplication, and the overall cost of government. Subpanels 
were planned to specifically address 1) tax reform and the assessment system; 2) 
emergency services; 3) social services; 4) transportation and utilities; 5) municipal 
17 .„ Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 178 
18 Ibid, Pg. 182 
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administration; 6) education; and 7) public health.19 Given the government's intention 
to move quickly, time lines were extremely tight with the Panel directed to provide short 
sequential reports from the subpanels, and have all of the Panel's work completed within 
seven months. 
The WDW Panel adopted four guiding principles20 for its wide ranging scope of work: 
• Municipalities were to be seen as having strong roles in "hard" services to 
property and infrastructure, while "soft" human services such as education, child 
care, health and welfare would be seen more appropriately as a provincial 
responsibility. 
Income redistribution, as a "soft" service, should be funded provincially. 
• Where possible, only one level of government should be responsible for spending 
decisions, and that government should have funding responsibility. 
• There should be an appropriate balance between the allocation of responsibilities 
and availability of resources, i.e., service exchanges between levels of government 
should be revenue neutral. 
In all, the WDW Panel made over 200 recommendations within these principles. As the 
Ministry of Health was in the midst of its own health-care restructuring process, it was 
19 ., Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 183 
20 Ibid, Pg. 185 
hesitant to participate in WDW and the seventh subpanel on Public Health never came to 
fruition. Health issues were addressed instead by the Social Services subpanel, or in the 
case of ambulance services, through the emergency services discussions. The Emergency 
Services subpanel report of November 12, 1996, viewed ambulance services as part of the 
health care system and recommended that they continue to be provincially funded. This 
recommendation included fully funding Toronto EMS ($35 million) which had a lengthy 
history of cost-sharing ambulance service costs to allow for levels of service above the 
provincial "standard".21 
Within three weeks of Crombie's final report letter on December 23, 1996, the 
government acted on its disentanglement plans. Rather than producing discussion papers 
that were open to negotiation with stakeholders, the government's "Megaweek" 
announcements unveiled final plans obviously intended for quick passage by its majority 
in the legislature. While the government accepted most of Crombie's recommendations, 
its own agenda forced a departure on several key elements. 
Harris' stated intention to gain full control of education, directly contradicted both a 
WDW Panel guiding principle and the recommendation in Crombie's final letter. If such 
a huge expenditure moved from the residential property tax base, there was simply no 
way that other high cost human services such as social services, could also be fully 
c 
21 WDW Panel, Emergency Services Letter - November 12, 1996 
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transferred. It became a fairly simple exercise then, of filling the tax gap left by 
education, with other services that could be transferred to the municipalities. Graham and 
Phillips describe this mathematical exercise as the reason "why social housing - which 
was not part of the Crombie panel's discussions - became part of the Megaweek 
equation.".22 While not officially confirmed, anecdotal information would indicate that 
the downloading of ambulance services was a similar monetary chip put forward in direct 
opposition to Crombie's recommendations. 
The announcements over four days during the week of January 13, 1997, consolidated the 
government's disentanglement initiatives. Monday saw education costs removed from 
the residential tax base with the number of school boards and trustees cut as well, while 
Tuesday was the day for ambulance and other soft services. As of 1998, municipalities 
would assume full responsibility for the cost of ambulance services, as well as social 
housing, public health, special care homes and rural policing. In addition, the cost of 
child care, long term care and welfare programs, shifted significantly to the 
municipalities. Wednesday saw hard services such as local airports and femes, public 
transit, water and sewage treatment transferred to municipalities, while Thursday revealed 
the planned introduction of property-tax reform based on actual-value assessment. 
22 Who Docs What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 187 
Despite evidence to the contrary, the Harris government continued to deny the initiative 
was merely a downloading of costs to the municipalities. Graham and Phillips noted the 
major municipal concerns that: 
expenditures on services with consistently countercyclical demands (such 
as welfare) or with consistently rising costs (such as long term care) (and 
ambulance services - author's comment) would undermine the stability of 
municipal revenue sources. To the municipal sector, the province appeared 
to have been strategic in downloading services with costs that were rising 
or difficult to control while assuming education, the costs of which are more 
constant and controllable. If stable or declining birthrates are any predictor 
of education costs, education expenditures may eventually shrink.23 
Months later with the deadline for devolution approaching, then Municipal Affairs and 
Housing Minister Al Leach, continued to reinforce the government's view that WDW 
was not about downloading: 
this is not about counting the number of services and dividing them up 
between the province and municipalities. This is about improving the 
way we all deliver services... clarifying lines of responsibility... increasing 
accountability... lowering costs... providing better services to the people 
of this province.24 
16 
23 "Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 191 
f 24 \ Speaking Notes for Minister Al Leach - Association of Counties and Regions Conference, Sudbury, 
October 6, 1997, Pg. 6 
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THE TRANSITION TO MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF AMBULANCE SERVICES 
As of January 1, 1998, Upper Tier Municipalities became responsible for 100% of land 
ambulance costs. The initial municipal response was overwhelming opposition. While 
many municipalities felt that ambulance services were a clear and appropriate provincial 
Health responsibility, more were simply concerned with the fiscal impact of any 
downloading to the local tax base. However, the intensity of opposition lessened 
significantly once negotiations between the government and AMO resulted in a March 
1999 cost-sharing announcement. Among other funding changes, the province agreed to 
pay 50% of approved ambulance costs, retroactive to January 1, 1999.25 26 
In conjunction with the initial funding responsibility transfer, all Upper Tier 
Municipalities and Designated Delivery Agents had been given overall operational 
responsibility for land ambulance services, effective January 1, 2000. This responsibility 
allowed municipalities to either contract or directly deliver land ambulance services. 
With the March 1999 announcement regarding 50/50 cost sharing, the deadline to assume 
operational responsibility was postponed until January 1, 2001 at the request of 
municipalities.27 
25 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 2 
/P»v 26 Local Services Realignment Guide, Pages 4.38-4.39 f 
27 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 2 
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During the subsequent transition period, the Minister adopted recommendations made by 
system stakeholders through the Land Ambulance Transition Taskforce (LATT), in 
setting guiding principles for municipalities to adhere to upon selecting a service delivery 
option.28 29 Each municipality was required to ensure an uninterrupted transfer of 
ambulance service from the Province, with the service provided conforming to the 
Ambulance Act, applicable regulations and other relevant legislation. The guiding 
principles adopted,30 required ambulance service to continue to be: 
• Accessible: All residents of Ontario are to have equal access to ambulance service 
regardless of socio-economic or demographic status. Upper Tier Municipalities, 
in co-operation with their delivery agents, will be responsible for ensuring that 
sufficient resources are available to guarantee reasonable access to ambulance 
service. 
Integrated: Each ambulance service and ambulance is an integrated part of the 
Emergency Health Care Services System of the Province. Patient transport 
between health care facilities for medically essential services must remain an 
essential part of this system. Central Ambulance Communications Centres 
(CACCs) will ensure that the closest available, appropriate ambulance vehicle 
responds to a call to meet the needs of a patient. Upper Tier Municipalities, in co 
operation with their delivery agents, will be responsible for ensuring that land 
no 
Review of the Ambulance Regulation/Report of the Land Ambulance Transition Task Force, Pg. 3 
29 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 4 
30 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pg. 7 
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ambulance service continues to be an integrated part of the provincial Emergency 
Health Care Services System. 
• Seamless: The closest available and appropriate ambulance will respond to a 
patient at any time and in any jurisdiction regardless of political, administrative or 
other artificially imposed boundaries. Upper Tier Municipalities and their service 
delivery agents are obliged to ensure that ambulance services are readily available 
regardless of location or timing. 
Accountable: Ambulance service operators are medically, operationally and 
financially accountable to provide ambulance service and patient care that is of the 
highest possible caliber. Service delivery will be monitored by municipalities, as 
well as through Base Hospitals, CACCs and the Ministry of Health and Long 
Term Care. Upper Tier Municipalities will bear overall accountability for service 
delivery through their agreements with operators. 
• Responsive: Municipalities and ambulance service operators must remain 
responsive to the changing health care, demographic, socio-economic and medical 
needs in their area. 
As part of the transition process and upon assuming control, vehicle and equipment assets 
owned by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, were transferred to municipalities 
at no cost. 
20 
OPTIONS FOR SERVICE DELIVERY 
There has been considerable debate over who should provide paramedic services to the 
public. However, even California's libertarian "free minds and free markets" think tank: 
The Reason Foundation, agrees that: 
the key to superior EMS performance is not, per se, whether government 
or the private sector is the paramedic provider, but whether the system is 
designed and structured for efficient and effective performance?1 
Both high and low quality services are routinely produced by organizations representing 
the entire socialized (public) and privatized spectrum of ambulance service providers. 
Ernst and Young's 1996 review of the then Metropolitan Toronto Ambulance Service, 
fiirther noted that: 
there is no scientific evidence that a particular EMS system run by a 
private provider, fire department, etc., is more effective than another. 
In addition, the studies that review one system/ownership model over 
another typically have specific agendas which add to the complexity 
of the analysis.32 
The Ontario Hospital Association position paper on ambulance issues suggests an 
overarching principle where regardless of service model: 
// is integral to the efficiency and effectiveness of the broader health 
system in Ontario, that the land ambulance system be based on sound 
financial, organizational and administrative principles so those who 
use ambulance services receive the best possible care.3i 
31 Privatizing Emergency Medical Services: How Cities Can Cut Costs and Save Lives , Pg. 5 
32 Review of the Metropolitan Toronto Ambulance Service, Pg. viii 
33 Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals, Pg. 5 
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Hospitals certainly have an important stake in ensuring the continued quality and 
timeliness of local ambulance services, as these factors afFect the condition of the patient 
upon arrival in their emergency departments. Receiving high quality pre-hospital care 
improves patient outcomes, decreases the length of a patient's hospital stay, and 
positively impacts on the overall use of hospital resources. Delays in the arrival of 
ambulances for transportation to other diagnostic and treatment facilities can create 
significant inefficiencies in hospital operations and cause discomfort and anxiety for 
patients. As hospitals pay for nursing escorts to accompany many of these patients, 
inefficiencies within the ambulance system can significantly increase hospital operational 
costs. 
With emergency call volumes continuing to grow, the availability of ambulances to 
perform inter-hospital transfers has lessened. Understandably, municipalities and 
hospitals alike, feel these essential transfers are a responsibility of the Ministry of Health 
and have requested additional funding and the development of a parallel patient transfer 
system to resolve these concerns. The Ministry has since engaged the 1BI Group to make 
recommendations on this issue, but at the time of transition, the responsibility for these 
transfers remained with the municipalities. 
As noted earlier, municipalities were given the option of either becoming the service 
provider themselves or contracting for ambulance services. Permitted contracting options 
\ were either continuing with all of the existing providers in their municipality, or awarding 
22 
delivery to the successful applicant in a call for "highest quality, best price" proposals. 
With a key theme of the Common Sense Revolution being the "open for business" 
competitiveness agenda, many felt that the government was promoting fully privatized 
ambulance service in the Province. A number of groups and supporting documents 
appeared overnight, espousing the virtues of privatized ambulance service under the guise 
of Public-Private partnerships.34 While the documents tended to disguise their blatant 
preference for privatization with well written overviews that educated the inexperienced 
on Emergency Medical Services basics, they were conspicuous in their sponsorship by 
major American ambulance consolidators and private ambulance associations. 
Surprising I'm sure, to those promoting WDW as a means of cutting the size of 
government through "contracting out", many municipalities reviewed the options 
available and ultimately chose to deliver ambulance services. Other municipalities chose 
to temporarily contract with an established provider while "learning the ambulance 
business". Several of these municipalities are now converting to the direct delivery 
model as well. 
What is perhaps more surprising, is the reduction in significance of "not-for-profit" 
hospital-based ambulance services. Hospital-based services made up nearly 40% of all 
ambulance services in the province at the time of devolution, and were the principal 
jP*v 34 E.g., Contracting for Emergency Ambulance Services - Revised for Use in Ontario; Options for 
' Municipal Emergency Medical Services - A User's Guide (Ontario); Towards Best Practices in Ambulance Services 
- A Submission to the Ontario Land Ambulance Task Force 
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providers in northern Ontario (62% in Northeastern and 55% in Northwestern Ontario).35 
Today, only 28% of the Designated Delivery Agents contract with one or more hospitals 
to provide service36, and the number continues to drop. 
Many hospitals did not show any interest in bidding for contracted services, choosing to 
concentrate on their "core" hospital services rather than subsidizing an underfunded 
ambulance system. There were however, key exceptions in major players such as 
Kingston and Niagara's Hotel Dieu Hospitals, that both felt regionalized ambulance 
service operations were key health services they should provide for their communities. 
0**^ In considering service delivery options, municipalities conducted a number of in-depth 
costing reviews and failed attempts at negotiating reasonable contracts with existing 
service providers.37 A number of significant experiences are summarized as examples: 
The IBI Group, acting as consultants for ten Southwestern Ontario Upper Tier 
Municipalities (Bruce, Elgin, Grey, Huron, Lambton, Middlesex, Oxford, Perth, 
Chatham-Kent, and then Haldimand-Norfolk), reported "Municipal Delivery" 
(direct delivery) as the least expensive model for providing ambulance service in 
all ten of the study municipalities. "Municipal Delivery" was between 2.3% and 
35 Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals, Pg. 10 
36 Compiled from EMS Municipal Organizational Chart - Association of Municipal Emergency Medical 
j^ Services of Ontario, and Emergency Health Services Branch Directory or Ambulance System Services 
37 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pgs. 10-11 
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3.2% less costly (mean 2.7%) than "Service Management" (contracted out).38 
Despite this determination, six of these municipalities initially chose contracting 
out, although two have since converted to direct delivery. 
In a similar review conducted for Durham, York and Halton Regions, IBI 
projected the cost differences between a "Public Service" (direct delivery) model 
and "Private-for-Profit" (contracted out) model. By 2004, the "Public Service" 
model was estimated to save $2.86, $3.06 and $1.46 million annually in Durham, 
York and Halton Regions respectively.39 
Niagara Region chose to undertake an RFP process for contracts reflecting the 
existing level of service, then compared the preferred bidder to an independently 
created Direct Delivery Business Plan. Three bids were received: Hotel Dieu 
Hospital (the existing provider in St. Catharines), Canadian Medical Response 
(CMR) - A division of Laidlaw, and Rural/Metro Ontario. Over the five year term 
of the contract, the two private contractors bid $6.87 - $11.7 million more than 
Hotel Dieu ($1.37 - $2.34 million per year). Despite this, the year 2000 costs by 
Hotel Dieu were $.6 million more than the same level of service under the "Direct 
Delivery" option. As the independently created proposal lacked certain critical 
elements, the Region chose to award the initial contract to Hotel Dieu, while 
further considering and developing the "Direct Delivery" option. 
38 Southwestern Ontario Municipalities Land Ambulance Service Review 
39 Land Ambulance Services Review - The Regional Municipalities of Durham, York and Halton 
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Hamilton-Wentworth Region (Now the New City of Hamilton) chose "Direct 
Delivery" after an unsuccessful negotiation attempt with existing provider, CMR. 
The "Direct Delivery" budget for 2000 was $11.9 million as compared to the 
CMR bid of $13.7 million, for an annual saving of approximately $1.805 million. 
In work completed for the Region of Sudbury (Now the City of Greater Sudbury), 
IBI predicted 2002 service costs of $12.7 million for outsourcing vs. $10.6 million 
for "Direct Delivery". The outsourcing costing included 14% in estimated 
business allowances/contingencies.40 
In an internal review, Waterloo Region predicted that "Direct Delivery" would 
provide an immediate saving of over $666,300 per annum over the cost of 
"Contracting Out", and that the difference would grow with the anticipated 
enhancement of service levels.41 
Four years after the original devolution announcement, the process of transferring 
responsibility for land ambulance service from the province to municipalities, was finally 
completed. As of January 1, 2001, all Upper Tier Municipalities and Designated Delivery 
Agents assumed full responsibility to contract for, or to directly deliver ambulance 
service within their designated areas. 
40 Land Ambulance Services Study, Interim Report - Regional Municipality of Sudbury 
41 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pg. 48 
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There are presently 50 land ambulance service areas covering the province, of which 24 
are Upper Tier Municipalities and 26 are designated land ambulance delivery agents. Of 
the 50 service areas, 41 are also Consolidated Municipal Service Managers (CMSMs) for 
Public Housing and Social Services.42 In addition, three First Nations communities act as 
ambulance Designated Delivery Agents for the James Bay Coast, Oshweken (Six 
Nations), and Wikwemikong areas. 
Although the mixture continues to evolve, at the time of writing, Upper Tier 
Municipalities and Designated Delivery Agents are providing service as follows: 
• 23 deliver ambulance services as a department of the organization (Direct 
f* Delivery); 
• 24 contract out ambulance services to another agency or coiporation; and 
3 use a combination of direct delivery and contracting out. 
Three designated delivery services have announced plans to convert contracted service to 
direct delivery, effective January 1, 2003. By that date, direct delivery of ambulance 
services will be provided to over two-thirds of Ontario's population.43 
42 Roles and Responsibilities - 2001 - The Provincial-Municipal Relationship in Human Services 
43 Calculated from Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories, and Census 
Divisions, 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
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CHANGES IN ACCOUNTABILITY 
Historically, the Ministry of Health funded, directed and managed all elements of the 
provincial ambulance system, including policy development, service design and delivery, 
the Base Hospital quality assurance programs, dispatch of EMS resources, as well as 
providing vehicles and other capital equipment. With the recent devolution of land 
ambulance services to Upper Tier Municipalities, a new inter-governmental management 
relationship has emerged. This partnership is described by the IBI group in their recently 
completed "External Review of Hamilton CACC": 
The result is a newly evolving management paradigm in which all land 
ambulance stakeholders, including UTMs, MOHLTC and CACC must 
leant to function within a decentralized system of shared accountability, 
with shared authority for specific components of the system, while working 
collectively to ensure the efficient, effective and seamless delivery of quality 
emergency medical services (EMS).44 
While provincial and municipal responsibilities for ambulance service are set out in 
legislation, the system stakeholders have been working through the Land Ambulance 
Implementation Steering Committee (LAISC) to establish and modify the appropriate 
policies, protocols and working relationships necessary in the new paradigm. 
44 External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 4 
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The Ambulance Act sets out the Minister's duties and powers to45: 
• administer and enforce the Act; 
• establish a council for the purpose of advising the Minister on matters respecting 
the provision of ambulance services46; 
• ensure a balanced and integrated system of ambulance and communication 
services; 
• establish, maintain and operate communication services, alone or in co-operation 
with others, and to fund such services; 
• establish standards for Certification, Patient Care and Transportation, Ambulance 
Service Documentation, Response Times and Communicable Disease, ensure 
#**" compliance with these standards, and appoint an authority to certify ambulance 
operators; 
• monitor, inspect and evaluate ambulance services, investigate complaints; and 
• fund and ensure the provision of air ambulance services. 
45 Sec. 4.(3): Part II - Provincial Responsibilities - Ambulance Act 
46 At present, LAISC serves this role 
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Interestingly, while the Ministry's responsibility for funding air ambulance services is 
established under the Act, financial support of land ambulance services is provided 
through a much more permissive statement. Section 4.(3) in Part II of the Act, states: 
The Minister may (emphasis added by a\ithor)make grants to upper-tier 
municipalities, local municipalities, delivery agents and operators for the 
purpose of ensuring the provision of services under this act." 
Upper Tier Municipalities are responsible for all costs associated with land ambulance 
service, subject to any such grants made by the Minister (currently 50% of approved costs 
as determined by a Ministry funding template). They must also48: 
• establish governance mechanisms and the organizational structure that will 
manage the local ambulance system; 
• develop short and long-term plans for meeting the needs of persons in the 
municipality, and engage in planning with neighbouring municipalities to ensure 
seamless service across area boundaries; 
• determine whether to deliver the services directly or in a contracted relationship 
with a third party, and if so, manage contracts with these parties; 
• ensure the supply of vehicles, equipment, services and information necessary for 
the proper provision of ambulance service; 
• ensure the training and supervision of staff, maintenance of vehicles and 
equipment, and the provision of a quality assurance program; and 
47 Sec. 4.(3): Part II - Provincial Responsibilities - Ambulance Acl 
48 Roles and Responsibilities - 2001 - The Provincial-Municipal Relationship in Human Services, Pgs. 3-5 
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ensure that service levels and quality are maintained, as is compliance with the 
legislated land ambulance service standards. 
A MEASURE OF PROVINCIAL EMS FUNDING BASED ON POPULATION 
AND SYSTEM CALL GROWTH 
During the last decade of total Ministry of Health control of ambulance services, 
providers complained constantly of serious under-resourcing from their masters. Hospital 
restructuring and a growing, aging population, seriously affected local ambulance 
services' ability to maintain appropriate service levels, especially in the rapid growth 
regions in and around the GTA. Even EHS has hesitatingly admitted to the need for 
additional funding. In their 1993 presentation to the Ambulance Study Committee 
reviewing systemwide governance options, EHS noted that "the current system, although 
under-funded, gives good value for the money.".49 The Ontario Hospital Association's 
position paper: "Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals" further suggested that 
many costs of providing ambulance service were not being funded (at least to 
Hospital-based services), and "that a more accurate cost of transport may be 22% greater 
than the transfer payments now made by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care".50 
>sr»\ 49 Report of the Ambulance Study Committee, Pg. 9 
f 
50 Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals, Pg. 42 
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Historical Emergency Health Services Branch expenditures are detailed in Appendix II, 
with comparators broken down at Appendix IVs1. A comparison of annual expenditures 
(April to March) to provincial population (as of July 1st each year) reveals a yearly cost 
per Ontario resident ranging from a low of $26.25 (1998-1999) to a high of $34.73 in 
2000-2001. When the entire time frame from fiscal year 1996-1997 to 2001-2002 is 
reviewed, per resident EHS expenditures rose 12.5% or $1.12 ($28.53 - $32.10 
respectively). The provincial population during the same time frame rose a similarl 1.6% 
or 1.53 million residents. Unfortunately, an aging and ailing population resulted in 
provincial ambulance call growth during the same years, of nearly 234,000 patient 
carrying calls (Codes 1-4), and almost 342,000 calls overall (Codes 1-4+8). This growth 
(f^ in call volume represented 26.4% and 30.5% increases respectively. 
Emergency calls (Codes 3-4) rose 34.8% in the same time period (Calculated from data at 
Appendix IV). Ontario remains well above the industry expectations of 1 emergency 
response per day for every 7,000 - 10,000 residents52, with a calculated volume of 1.32 -
1.89 during 2001 (Calculated from data at Appendix IV). 
Although the provincial contribution kept pace with population growth between 1996-
2001, it seriously underfunded system call growth. In fact, the 2001-2002 EHS estimated 
51 Call volumes as provided by EHS from ARIS data. Received July 11, 2002. Expenditure calculations 
using data from Appendix II. 
52 Predicting Demand for Ambulance Service 
expenditure per patient carrying call ($340.29) and all calls ($260.86), is less than the 
same per call calculations in 1996-1997 ($342.72 and $271.36 respectively). 
When a 10.7% cumulative Ontario inflation rate is factored in for the same five-year time 
period", current EHS expenditures reflected in 1996 dollars total $28.99 per resident, 
$307.28 per patient carrying call, and $235.56 per call (Cl-4+8). True EHS expenditures 
per call are now 89.7% (Cl-4) and 86.8% (Cl-4+8) of those during 1996-1997, despite 
over a 26% increase in call volume. It is important to realize however, that while the true 
EHS contribution has fallen, it now represents (at best) only 50% of EMS system 
funding. 
Another, albeit poorly documented concern, has been the disparity in provincial funding 
between geographic regions. While limited in scope, the data collected for our six sample 
municipalities (i.e., Durham, Essex, Halton, Middlesex, Niagara and Waterloo) as 
summarized at Appendix VI, reveals Ministry funding across Southern Ontario ranging 
from $11.70 - $22.80 per resident during 1998. 
53 Consumer Price Index Historical Summary 
THE RESPONSE TIME "STANDARD" 
As part of the regulations set in place to "safeguard" the public in the wake of devolution, 
the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care amended the Ambulance Act to require that: 
The operator of an ambulance service in an upper tier municipality or designated 
area shall ensure that, in 90% of the priority 4 (life threatening) calls received in 
a twelve month period, the response time performance is equal to the response 
time performance set by the person who operated the service in 1996.5* 
1996 was selected for the benchmark year as this was the last full year that the Ministry 
had total control of ambulance service operations. While this requirement became known 
as the 1996 Emergency Response Time "Standard", it was anything but a true level of 
quality. A standard is normally thought of as being authoritative or of permanent value, 
^ and so is widely performed.55 In reality, this "Standard" simply required ambulance 
services to provide the same level of service as in 1996. A municipality with poor 
response times in 1996 was only guaranteed the same poor response times in 2001 and 
beyond. 
In a survey of 1996 emergency response times in 18 Upper Tier Municipalities and their 
192 local municipalities, the 90* percentile response time ranged from a low of 5 minutes 
50 seconds, to a high of 48 minutes 52 seconds.56 Each of these municipalities at the 
extreme ends of the spectrum, would be seen as "meeting the standard" if they maintained 
54 Sec. 42. (l)Ontario Regulation 501/97 Amended to O. Reg. 571/98 
55 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998, Pg. 1812 
56 Unpublished undated survey by the Association of Municipal Emergency Medical Services of Ontario 
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these response times, despite the obvious disparity in service levels. In the calculation, 
the operator's response time performance is measured from the time the crew is notified 
of the call, until the time paramedics arrive on-scene. This represents only the ambulance 
service components of reaction and travel time. To obtain a truly representative EMS 
"system response time", an additional two minutes must be added to address call handling 
time lines used by Ministry of Health dispatch centres. In comparison to this flexible 
"standard", the industry (urban) standard is a 90* percentile response time of less than 
nine minutes from the time the call is received at the dispatch centre, until the time 
paramedics arrive on scene.57 
With the previously documented provincial call and population growth, and the lack of 
historic service enhancement funding to address these issues, most municipalities 
suffered from response times well above the 1996 levels by the time they took over 
responsibility for ambulance service. Municipalities took exception to being forced to 
provide a level of service that was not already being provided by the Ministry of Health at 
the time of transition. In response to municipal pressure through AMO and the Land 
Ambulance Implementation Steering Committee (LAISC), the Ministry agreed to provide 
additional funding to help return response times to the 1996 baseline. 
In late 2000, the province distributed a funding template defining land ambulance costs 
which were eligible for a 50% provincial grant. The template however, applied only to the 
57 Principles of EMS Systems, Pg. 115 
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level of ambulance service in existence on the day of assumption by the municipality. 
Although municipalities have completed numerous "best practices" template submissions 
to support their requests for both the base funding and 1996 response time issues funding, 
all are still waiting for Ministry funding to address 2001 and 2002 shortfalls. At the most 
recent LAISC meeting (July 29, 2002), the Ministry refused to indicate when such a 
funding announcement could be expected. 
In light of serious response time issues and the ongoing Ministry procrastination, some 
municipalities chose to add resources notwithstanding, hoping to receive retroactive 
funding at a later date. Others chose to implement only the municipally funded 50% of 
planned enhancements, while the remainder refused to trust any predicted enhancement 
approvals and withheld improvements until funding was actually in hand. These varied 
approaches have obviously produced mixed results (and variations in Ministry cost-
sharing percentages), some of which are described below. 
A COMPARISON OF DEVOLUTION EFFECTS ON SAMPLE 
MUNICIPALITIES 
Six Upper Tier Municipalities were selected for in depth reviews of the service and 
financial effects of LSR. The Region of Niagara and County of Middlesex were selected 
to represent Upper Tier Municipalities that had opted for "Contracting Out". The 
Regions of Durham, Halton, and Waterloo represented those municipalities choosing 
"Direct Delivery", while the County of Essex was selected as a hybrid utilizing both 
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"Direct Delivery" and "Contracting Out". All of the samples were participants in the 
province's OPALS (Ontario Pre Hospital Advanced Life Support) study providing the 
highest standard of patient care available, in at least a portion of each UTM. The six 
municipalities combined, represented a population of 2,509,379 (22% of the province's 
population) during the 2001 census.58 
The municipalities polled, provided selected information for the calendar years 1996 -
2001. These years represent the two most recent census periods for population growth 
data, while 1996 was also used by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care to set 
emergency response time standards. Where available, the information provided included 
total Population, the annual municipally-approved EMS expenditures, number of 
ambulance hours staffed and stations occupied, call volumes, and the Region-wide 
response time used to measure compliance with the legislated standard. Due to a lack of 
consistently accurate municipal population data by year, only Census data was used in the 
calculations. All data for the sample municipalities is detailed at Appendix V. 
Due to service costs pre-devolution being mixed between multiple providers and across 
municipal boundaries and different fiscal years, it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible 
to determine true costs for a given Upper Tier Municipality during 1998. In three of the 
municipalities, i.e., Durham, Essex and Niagara, the major provider pre-transition was the 
■ 58 Calculated from Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories, and Census 
Divisions, 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
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Ministry of Health, and invoiced costs included a myriad of allocated but unconfirmed 
administrative costs from head office operations. At the same time, much of the overhead 
cost information was not provided (i.e., Ministry self-funded WSIB costs and other 
benefits). These services are similarly not included in the payment details provided in 
Public Accounts, so previous years' costs cannot be confirmed beyond the Ministry 
provided estimates. Many of these operations functioned out of stations built with 
Ministry funds on hospital property, and leased back to the operators at $ 1 a year. Upon 
transition, most hospitals either evicted ambulance operators or raised rents to reflect 
market value. The additional costs of acquiring new stations are reflected in 2001 
municipal costs, but did not qualify for Ministry funding. 
Regional Municipality of Durham 
Durham Region had a 2001 Census population of 506,901. With ambulance service 
previously provided by a mixture of hospital, private and Ministry providers, Durham 
transitioned to municipal control on January 1, 2000. Since then, direct delivery has been 
provided by a division of the Public Health Department. 
In 1998, the municipality was billed $9.5 million as the 100% cost of the existing 
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $20.71 
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was 
calculated at $293.01. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $81.46. 
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The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $17.6 million (40% 
Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $34.77 based on the 2001 
Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at 
$424.23, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $109.91. During the 
time period, Durham added 43,799 vehicle hours, a 37.6% increase in non cost-shared 
coverage. 
County of Essex 
Essex County had a 2001 Census population of 374,975. With ambulance service 
previously provided by a mixture of private, volunteer and Ministry providers, Essex 
transitioned to municipal control on January 1, 2001. Since then, a unique delivery 
scheme has existed with direct delivery being provided by a stand alone County 
department in the City of Windsor alone (The area covered by the previous Ministry 
service). The remainder of the County is covered by the three previous contractors (two 
private and one volunteer service). 
In 1998, the municipality was billed $7.9 million as the 100% cost of the existing 
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $22.63 
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was 
calculated at $212.63. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $70.51. 
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The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $16.0 million (46% 
Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $42.70 based on the 2001 
Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at 
$337.97, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $135.13. During the 
time period, Essex added 6,049 vehicle hours, a 5.4% increase in non cost-shared 
coverage. 
Regional Municipality of Halton 
Halton Region had a 2001 Census population of 375,229. With ambulance service 
previously provided by a mixture of private and volunteer providers, Halton transitioned 
to municipal control on August 16, 2000. Since then, the hours provided by volunteers 
have been converted to paid hours. Direct delivery service is being provided as a division 
of the Health Department. 
In 1998, the municipality was billed $4.7 million as the 100% cost of the existing 
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $ 13.91. 
The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at $289.44. The cost per 
hour of ambulance service provided was $75.84. 
The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $9.7 million (32% Ministry 
cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $25.84 based on the 2001 Census 
population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at $435.67, and 
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the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $100.83. During the time period, 
Halton added 33,796 vehicle hours, a 54.2% increase in non cost-shared coverage. 
County of Middlesex 
Middlesex County had a 2001 Census population of 403,185. With ambulance service 
previously provided by a mixture of private contractors, Middlesex transitioned to 
municipal control on April 23, 2000. Since then, a single private contractor was selected 
in response to an RFP process. This contractor works under the supervision of the 
County Transportation and Emergency Services Department. 
In 1998, the municipality was billed $8.6 million as the 100% cost of the existing 
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $21.97 
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was 
calculated at $241.62. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $94.47, 
although there is a question as to what percentage of budgeted hours were actually 
delivered. 
The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $12.4 million (51.8% 
Ministry cost-share when 100% First Nations and OPALS funding applicable for this 
municipality are incorporated). This represented a per resident cost of $32.02 based on 
the 2001 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated 
at $289.06, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $139.05. During the 
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time period, Middlesex added 2,258 vehicle hours, a 2.5% increase in non cost-shared 
coverage. 
Regional Municipality of Niagara 
Niagara Region had a 2001 Census population of 410,574. With ambulance service 
previously provided by a mixture of hospital, private and Ministry providers, Niagara 
transitioned to municipal control on January 1, 2000. Since then, a single hospital 
contractor was selected in response to an RFP process. This contractor works under the 
supervision of the Niagara Region Health Department. 
In 1998, the municipality was billed $9.2 million as the 100% cost of the existing 
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $22.80 
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was 
calculated at $253.55. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $85.19. 
The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $15.3 million (36.6% 
Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $37.26 based on the 2001 
Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at 
$318.75, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $105.52. During the 
time period, Niagara added 37,000 vehicle hours, a 34.3% increase in non cost-shared 
coverage. 
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Regional Municipality of Waterloo 
The Region of Waterloo had a 2001 Census population of 438,515. With ambulance 
service previously provided by a hospital and private provider, Waterloo transitioned to 
municipal control on December 3, 2000. Since then, direct delivery service has been 
provided as a division of the Public Health department. 
In 1998, the municipality was billed $4.7 million as the 100% cost of the existing 
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $11.70 
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was 
calculated at $211.20. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $85.80. 
The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $6.7 million (49.3% 
Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $15.27 based on the 2001 
Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at 
$273.73, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $114.35. During the 
time period, Waterloo added 3,274 vehicle hours, a 5.9% increase in non cost-shared 
coverage. Since 1998, Waterloo has had the advantage of an alternative non-emergency 
transportation brokerage known as "Med-Lift". This brokerage redirects calls not 
requiring an ambulance to selected public and private providers. "Med-Lift" currently 
transports approximately 4,000 Code-1 and 2 patients that otherwise would have travelled 
by ambulance. Since 1999, this service has been cost-shared by the Region and area 
\ hospitals. 
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SUMMARY OF SAMPLE MUNICIPALITY COSTS AND SERVICES 
While the Ministry has used the average cost per call (Code 1 -4+8) as its measure for 
charging back cross-boundary use of ambulance service between municipalities, the 
number of standby calls (Code 8s) can be artificially influenced by both CACC and 
ambulance service policy. As such, only potentially patient carrying calls were used in 
the comparison pre and post-transition. Since a base level of emergency coverage is 
required to maintain response times regardless of call volume generated, the most 
sensitive indicator of ambulance service cost, is the cost per hour of actual ambulance 
service provided. This cost is primarily driven by wage costs and the level of service 
being provided (i.e., primary or advanced care). All of the sample municipalities 
f^ provided a degree of advanced care prior to transition, and all have increased the number 
of advanced care providers since. Similarly, all of the municipalities have added hours of 
ambulance service since the transition. 
Between 1998-2001, all six sample municipalities had significant increases in cost per 
resident (30.5% - 88.7%), cost per Code 1-4 call (19.6% - 58.9%), and cost per hour of 
ambulance service provided (23.9% - 91.6%). The municipalities all added service hours 
(2.5% - 54.2% increases), with a mean increase of 23.3%. Call volumes (Codes 1-4) 
increased over the time period between 9.0% and 36.2% (mean of 26.5%). If the call 
volume redirected by Waterloo's "Med-Lift" is incorporated into this call growth, the 
range levels to 26.2% - 36.2%, for a mean increase of 29.5% across the municipalities. 
Typically, if call volume increases, cost per call should decrease, all other things being 
equal, until utilization of existing resources is maximized. At that point, additional 
vehicles must be added and the cost per call and cost per resident climbs appropriately. 
Cost per hour is directly affected by wages, contractor profit, supply and equipment costs, 
the addition of ACPs, etc. Work to decrease response times includes adding vehicle 
hours, and may also involve adding stations. Cost per call and cost per resident climbs, 
although the cost per hour remains relatively constant so long as existing standards (e.g., 
% ACP coverage required) remain unchanged, except if stations are added. New station 
costs (e.g., debenture charges, rental and utility costs, etc.) will increase the cost per hour 
of service provided. 
When compared to 1998, the 2001 call volume increase was essentially the same across 
the group. As such, the increase in service hours related to call growth, should have been 
similar. In fact, the three direct delivery services added 32.6% more service hours while 
the two contract services added 18.4%. The one combination service added 5.4% in 
hours. 
Despite call volume growth, the cost per patient carrying call climbed 38.5% as a group, 
51.0% for direct delivery services, 21.4% for contractors, and 35.1% for the combined 
service. This reflects not only the serious pre-existing under-resourcing, but the political 
realities of increasing demand for service where none existed, adding ACPs, etc. 
45 
When compared to 1998 costs for the entire group of sample municipalities, the 2001 cost 
per resident increased 65.2% as a group. The three direct delivery services climbed 
33.5% while the two contract services rose 82.7%. The sole combination service cost per 
resident climbed 125.3%. Similarly, cost per hour of service increased 42.9% as a group, 
31.8% for direct delivery services, 48.8% for contractors, and 64.4% for the combined 
service. 
In summary, the municipal cost to provide ambulance service increased dramatically 
regardless of the service delivery option. Although call volume increases were similar 
(30.4% vs. 29.2% with Waterloo's "Med-Lift" factored in) across the sample 
municipalities, direct delivery services added significantly more service hours than 
contractors (32.6% vs. 18.4%), and yet had lower increases in cost per resident (33.5% vs. 
82.7%) and cost per hour (31.8% vs. 48.8%). Cost per call was the only comparator 
where the contractor increase was less than that of direct delivery (21.4% vs. 51.0%). 
Unfortunately, the combination service was difficult to evaluate as its costs did not 
consistently fall between direct delivery and contractor as expected. In fact, its 
combination cost per resident and cost per hour were significantly higher than both other 
options. As only one sample municipality was considered, additional research is required 
to determine whether this finding can be repeated. 
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MODELING THE COST OF IMPROVEMENTS IN RESPONSE TIME 
Despite making significant funding investments without the benefit of matching Ministry 
funding, none of our sample municipalities meet the industry nine minute gold standard. 
Three of the six sample municipalities still have 90* percentile emergency response times 
significantly above the 1996 standard (1 minute 19 seconds to 1 minute 32 seconds) in 
2001. The cost to reach the 1996 levels will be significant in these and other 
municipalities province-wide. In Niagara and Halton Regions, where the 1996 levels 
have been successfully reached, unmatched annual UTM investments of $6.1 and $5.0 
million respectively, were required since devolution. 
In the industiy's only documented work of its kind, Fischer, O'Halloran, et al in the 
Journal of Public Health Medicine59, describe the use of an "Ambulance Response 
Curve" to estimate how much response time is reduced by deploying an additional 
ambulance, and then use the marginal cost of this deployment to estimate the opportunity 
cost of each second's improvement in response time. 
The study utilizes a 1997-1998 data set from the Surrey Ambulance Service in the United 
Kingdom. The County of Surrey has a very stable population of 1.08 million (6.6% 
population growth between 1971-2000) with 15.8% of its population aged 65 years or 
59 Ambulance Economics, PP. 413-421 
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older.60 This compares with 2001 Ontario Census data indicating 12.9% of the provincial 
population is aged over 65.61 
Fischer and O'Halloran report that each reduction of one second in response time, costs 
the service 28,000 British Pounds per year, with a standard error of approximately 4.2%.62 
With the current exchange rate of 1 British Pound equaling 2.43 Canadian Dollars63, this 
translates to $68,040 Canadian per second of reduction. 
If this marginal cost is in fact transferable to the Ontario experience, Essex County (15 
seconds) would require an additional maintained investment of $1.0 million, Middlesex 
if^ (1 minute 19 seconds) $5.4 million, the Regions of Waterloo (1 minute 30 seconds) $6.1 
million, and Durham (1 minute 32 seconds) $6.3 million to return 2001 response times to 
their 1996 levels. 
In Halton Region where a 1 minute 11 second reduction has been accomplished since 
2000 to comply with the 1996 standard (10:56 - 9:45), the formula would calculate a 
needed investment of $4.8 million per year. In fact, their investment of 5.0 million 
60 Mid-Year Estimates of Population 2000, Surrey County Council Planning and Development Service 
61 Statistics Canada 2001 Census Analysis Series - Profile of the Canadian population by sex and age: 
Canada ages, Pg. 30 
62 Ambulance Economics, Pg. 418 
63 OANDA Currency Converter 
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annually represents $70,423 per second of improvement gained, but includes the cost of 
one additional station, and increased ACP staffing not covered in the Surrey scenario. 
Similarly in Niagara Region, a 1 minute 17 second reduction (11:55 - 10:38) has been 
accomplished at a cost of $6.1 million annually, with the addition of three stations and 
similarly increasing ACP staffing. The Surrey formula estimates such a reduction as 
costing $5.2 million. 
Both Regions appear to have received good value for their additional expenditures, which 
also included the conversion of volunteer and on-call hours to full-time in Halton and 
(f1^ Niagara respectively. 
The paper's authors take care to note that the "Ambulance Response Curve" model is 
specific to Surrey costs and conditions. Yet, the examples seem to confirm that marginal 
costs are remarkably similar between our two jurisdictions. In calculating the marginal 
cost of running an ambulance continuously (24/7) for a year, Fischer and O'Halloran 
utilized the cost of wages and benefits by paramedic level, added uniforms and vehicle 
leasing (which included maintenance and equipment), but did not include fuel or medical 
supplies, as demand was assumed not to increase simply with the addition of an 
ambulance. The marginal cost per year for each additional ambulance was estimated at 
/ 
250,000 Pounds" ($607,500 Canadian) which is comparable to the $600,000 figure 
commonly used when estimating the cost of adding a 24/7 ambulance in Ontario. 
There are differences between the costs used to calculate the Surrey model, and those of 
Ontario municipalities. The sample municipalities in Ontario have had to add stations to 
improve response times while the UK example does not include new building 
construction. Although the costs are included in both cases, Ontario municipalities 
purchase new vehicles and equipment, whereas Surrey leases both vehicles and 
equipment. Finally, the Surrey service controls its own resource movements (call 
volumes) by operating its own dispatch centre. In Ontario, low priority calls, standby 
r^ coverage and other cross-boundary assistance calls are controlled by Ministry directed 
dispatch centres. As such, a municipal investment in service levels intended to reduce 
emergency response times locally, can be exploited by the Ministry for other means in 
their quest to maintain an integrated and seamless EMS system province-wide. 
A key question would seem to be: Are we putting all our money in the right place? With 
a one minute reduction in actual on-road response time costing over $4.0 million (using 
the Surrey calculation), it is not difficult to imagine that use of available technology such 
as Automated Vehicle Locating (AVL) and appropriate Computer Aided Dispatch 
(CAD), along with appropriate staffing levels in our dispatch centres, could more 
economically reduce the overall response time by a minute or more. CACC dispatch time 
64 Ambulance Economics, Pg. 417 
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reductions should be seriously considered in concert with adding ambulance service 
resources to improve response times. 
COMPETITION AND COMPENSATION 
Prior to the devolution and realignment of ambulance responsibilities, the paramedic 
wage scale was essentially consistent across Ontario. Central bargaining for the crown 
agent services closely paralleled gains obtained by the Ontario Public Service (OPS) 
paramedics directly employed by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. These 
benchmarks accompanied by Ministry-imposed wage increase limits and their direct 
control of funding, effectively controlled annual wage increases across the province. In 
1999, maximum hourly wages were standardized at approximately $20.00 for primary 
care and $22.00 for advanced care paramedics working for land ambulance services (with 
the exception of Toronto).65 66 As advanced care was perceived by the Province as an 
"experiment" outside of Toronto and Hamilton, only those twenty municipalities 
participating in OPALS67, were allowed (and funded) to employ the higher standard (and 
higher paid) advanced care paramedics. 
65 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 20 
66 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pg. 42 
#"^ 6? Burlington, Cambridge, Grimsby, Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo, Lindsay, London, Mississauga, 
* Niagara Falls, Oakville, Ottawa-Carleton, Peterborough, Port Colbourne, Port Hope/Coburg, St. Catharines, Saraia, 
Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Wclland and Windsor as shown in OPALS Study Communities 
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Since transition to municipal control, a number of issues have served to drive EMS wages 
upwards. Competition throughout the province for experienced ambulance staff at all 
levels is the result of municipalities attempting to both address the legislated response 
time standard, and provide service levels demanded by their taxpayers and elected 
officials, e.g., ambulance stations in communities that previously had none, 24-hour 
coverage where partial daily coverage existed, advanced care paramedics instead of solely 
primary care, etc. 
This demand was compounded by a simultaneous change in the province's community 
college paramedic training programs. Ministry direction to add additional training 
elements and change the existing one year programs to two years, resulted in no PCP 
graduating classes in 2001... the initial year of municipal takeover and greatest demand. 
As advanced care training programs had their student numbers even more tightly 
restricted by the Ministry, ACPs were an even rarer, more valued commodity. 
With municipal paramedic demand growing and no graduating class to fill the void, 
wages were initially increased by the GTA services to prevent a loss of their existing staff 
to Toronto EMS needs (traditionally the highest need and highest paid) and other services 
initiating or expanding their ACP programs. The effect snowballed with outlying 
services similarly raising their wages to retain and attract employees, and ultimately 
paramedics in more rural and remote Ontario moving to take these higher paying jobs in 
EMS growth communities. 
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The situation may at best be described as fluid, with many experienced 
personnel (particularly experienced paramedics) relocating from one 
municipality to another in order to take advantage of the current 
opportunities (oftentimes more than once).68 
Where only a year earlier, paramedic positions were at a premium, and full-time 
employment often meant five or more years of part-time work, or a position in the north 
far from friends and family, it was now a seller's market, with municipalities everywhere 
offering well paying full-time positions, relocation allowances, funding for education, etc. 
By late 2001, the GTA and surrounding area wages had settled to approximately $24.50 
for primary care, and $27.25 for advanced care paramedics... a 20-25% increase over the 
pre-transition rates. 
One very negative effect of this competition for personnel, has been the virtual 
abandonment of remote northern EMS positions. Experience in the Thunder Bay District 
"suggests that most paramedics prefer to work for a larger service, where there are greater 
opportunities for professional development and career advancement."69 A number of 
services in the north are in desperate need of staff and have been forced to reduce 
coverage hours and in some cases, close stations altogether. Superior North EMS (The 
City of Thunder Bay operating as the ambulance delivery agent for the District of 
Thunder Bay) was forced to assume responsibility for contracted services in Nakina and 
Manitouwadge earlier this year, when contractors unable to fill paramedic vacancies, 
69 
6i External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 7 
EMS Delivery Corporate Report No. 2002.159, Pg. 6 
53 
withdrew their services.70 Superior North has resorted to flying in paramedics from 
southern Ontario to serve short-term locums in the needy areas. 
Municipalities operating direct delivery services have also been faced with Job 
Evaluation (JE) process requirements built into their municipal collective agreements. As 
the responsibilities of paramedic staff (especially advanced care paramedics) are 
compared to other unionized municipal staff, upward pressure on municipal wage grids 
has been the norm. A recent, as yet unpublished JE result in southwestern Ontario, has 
been estimated to increase paramedic wages by 20% over the current GTA norms. As the 
new rates exceed those of Police officers and Firefighters, this increase has the potential 
^^ of not only increasing EMS wages across Southern Ontario, but of increasing all 
emergency services wages in general. 
THE EFFECTS OF DEVOLUTION ON THE PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY 
HEALTH SERVICES BRANCH 
It has been noted that until 1978, the Emergency Health Services Branch of the Ministry 
of Health and Long Term Care had total control and funding responsibilities for all 
ambulance operations in Ontario. In addition, they directly operated ten land and five air 
ambulance services with their own employees. Beginning in 2000, the land operations 
were devolved to Upper Tier Municipalities as they assumed control of their local 
services. By the fall of 2001, all Ministry-operated air ambulance operations had been 
70 EMS Delivery Corporate Report No. 2002.159, Pg. 5 
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privatized in response to a Request for Proposals call. The Ministry of Health and Long 
Term Care continues to directly operate 11 of the 19 Central Ambulance 
Communications Centres (CACCs) in the province,71 and provides administrative system 
support through the Toronto head office and five geographically dispersed field offices. 
The Ministry is fully responsible for funding and providing all communications 
equipment, as well as funding air ambulance operations, first nations land ambulance 
services, and the provincial Base Hospital medical oversight programs. 
Annual expenditures for the Emergency Health Services Branch are detailed in Appendix 
II. The information shown is a compilation of data published by the Ministry of Finance 
in the Public Accounts - Statement of Expenditures for the given fiscal years,72 except for 
the 2001-2002 estimates which are produced by Management Board Secretariat73. 
The last fiscal year period during which the Ministry of Health had full funding (100%) 
and operational control of ambulance services was 1996-1997. During that year, $303.6 
million were allotted to ambulance services in Ontario.74 The next two fiscal periods 
were hybrids that combined partial years of 100% Ministry, 100% Municipal, and 50/50 
Ministry/Municipal funding. 
71 External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 10 
72 Public Accounts of Ontario 1996-1997 through 2000-2001 
73 Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31,2002 
74 Public Accounts 1996/97, Pg. 4-182 
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The 1999-2000 fiscal year was the first in which the 50/50 funding formula was fully in 
place. During that year, Ministry expenditures totalled $404.6 million,75 climbed to 
$405.9 million in 2000-2001,76 77 and are estimated at $381.1 million in 2001-2002.78 
Even if the lowest, most current year's estimate is used, the resulting $77.5 million 
increase over 1996-1997 (25.5%), is still a gross underestimation of total system-wide 
costs. Remembering that 1996-1997 represented 100% funding by the Ministry, while 
the current year represents a supposed 50% (or less) contribution, the actual increase in 
the annual cost of providing ambulance service province-wide is at least $112.2 million.79 
This is a 37% increase in annual costs since the last year of full Ministry control. 
There is however, an obvious error in the transfer payments shown in the 2001-2002 
expenditure estimates as published by Management Board. Transfer payments to 
municipal ambulance operations are shown at $34.7 million80 for the year... less than the 
$37.9 million shown for 1996-1997 81 when only ten municipalities (primarly remote) and 
Metropolitan Toronto, operated ambulance services. Toronto's transfer payment of $35.7 
75 Public Accounts 1999-2000, Pg. 4-191 
76 Public Accounts 2000-2001, Pg. 4-184 
77 due to one time transition costs and severance obligations 
78 Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for Uie fiscal year ending March 31, 2002, Pg. 19 
79 2001-2002 municipal transfer (even though in error) payments X 2 [S69.4M] + balance of 2001-2002 
EHS Expenditures [S346.4M] - EHS Total for 1996-1997 [S303.6M] 
z#*v Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2002, Pg. 19 
81 Public Accounts, 1996-1997, Pg. 4-183 
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million82 made up the bulk of the payment in that year, and rose to $52.8 million in 2000-
200183... more than the total provincial amount estimated for 2001-2002. In fact, the 
transfer payments for our six sample municipalities, totalled almost $26 million in 2000-
2001. With these municipalities representing 22% of the provincial population, the 
municipal transfer payment for the year should total at least $118 million. 
If this $118 million estimate is inserted into the equation to calculate the 2001-2002 
actual cost of operating ambulance services province wide,84 annual costs actually 
increased some $295.5 million in 2001-2002 over that of 1996-1997... a 97% increase in 
annual costs. 
Two other factors must be considered when measuring the true effect on the EHS branch. 
It was noted earlier that between 2000 and 2002, the Ministry of Health divested itself of 
its direct land and air ambulance operations. This should have resulted in an immediate 
and dramatic reduction in wage costs, albeit with a corresponding increase in transfer 
payments. While the total effects of the air ambulance privatization will not be shown 
until the next fiscal period (2002-2003), the portion of the EHS budget allocated to 
salaries, wages and benefits, continues to climb dramatically despite these changes. The 
82 Public Accounts, 1996-1997, Pg. 133 
83 Public Accounts, 2000-2001, Pg. 149 
84 2001-2002 municipal transfer payments X 2 [S336M] + balance of 2001-2002 EHS Expenditures 
[S263.1M] - EHS Total for 1996-1997 [S303.6M] 
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2001-2002 estimated cost of $69.6 million as published in the Management Board 
Secretariat Expenditure Estimates85, is a 52% increase over 2000-2001 ($45.8 million)86, 
and a 32% increase over 1999-2000 ($52.6 million)87, despite a reduction of 
approximately 700 operational staff. 
When this published increase was questioned during a recent conversation between the 
author and the Branch's Financial Analyst88, she stated that monies had been incorrectly 
allocated in the current estimates, and that some of the Salaries and Wages correctly 
belonged under Transfer Payments (This further confirmed our concerns about accuracy 
of the Transfer Payments costing). She refused to provide the correct amounts, but said 
they would be adjusted appropriately in the upcoming Public Accounts, Statement of 
Expenditures.89 
If the 2001-2002 estimate for salaries, wages and benefits is in fact incorrect, the best 
available comparison would then be between fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. In 
this time period, EHS salaries, wages and benefits dropped from $52.6 million to $45.8 
million, a reduction of 13%. 
85 Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2002, Pg. 19 
86 Public Accounts - 2000-2001, Pg. 4-185 
87 Public Accounts - 1999-2000, Pg. 4-192 
Telephone conversation with M. Wilcox, July 23, 2002 
89 Publication Expected: Fall, 2002 
58 
Despite numerous written and verbal requests for staffing information by Branch sections, 
EHS refused to provide the requested information for inclusion in this paper. As such, a 
rough modelling of EHS staffing levels was attempted from available information. 
Details are shown in Appendix VII. 
The 1999-2000 (last available) Civil Service Commission Annual Report reported 8,570 
employees at the Ministry of Health, representing 15.6% of a total Civil Service 
complement of 54,952.90 No detail was provided regarding staff numbers assigned to 
each branch of the Ministry. The Report did provide data which allowed calculation of 
the percentage of the Civil Service paid in each ten thousand dollar salary range. When 
the $41.8 million shown in 1999-2000 EHS Expenditures for Salaries and Wages91 was 
separated using these same percentages, a total complement of approximately 828 Full 
Time Equivalent employees was estimated at a mean annual salary of $50,500. This 
compares favourably to an overall Ministry of Health mean of $53,026 calculated by 
dividing the Ministry salaries and wages expenditure by the Civil Service Commission 
employee count. 
Wage increases were limited by government policy to 2% in each of 2000-2001 and 
2001-2002. Without increasing the number of staff, this should have raised overall EHS 
Salaries and Wages to $42.6 million in 2000-2001, and $43.5 million in 2001-2002. In 
90 Civil Service Commission Annual Report -1999-2000, Pg. 25 
91 Public Accounts - 1999-2000, Pg. 4-192 
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fact, the estimated Salaries and Wages for 2001-2002 are reported by Management Board 
Secretariat as $58.2 million92, a 39.2% increase over 1999-2000. When the 2% increase 
for each year, is applied to the mean annual salary previously calculated, a new mean of 
$51,510 is calculated for 2000-2001, with a mean of $52,540 for 2001-2002. 
When the 2001-2002 mean wage is divided into the $58.2 million annual total as 
estimated, a complement of approximately 1,107 Full Time Equivalent employees results. 
This would represent a staff increase of 279 employees (33.7%) within the EHS Branch 
despite a reduction often land and five air ambulance services with their respective 
employee complements. 
Given the Branch's claim that the 2001-2002 Expenditure Estimates are incorrect, EHS 
staffing was estimated for the 2000-2001 year as well. When the 2000-2001 mean wage 
of $51,510 is divided into the $35.4 million salaries and wages allotment93, a complement 
of approximately 687 employees (a calculated reduction of 141 full time equivalents from 
our 1999-2000 estimate of 828 FTEs) is revealed. As the Branch verbally claims a 
reduction of 641 staff (602 paramedics, 23 managers and 16 administrative staff) through 
the devolution of Ministry-operated land ambulance services94, the actual 2000-2001 
92 Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31,2002, Pg. 19 
93 Public Accounts - 2000-2001, Pg. 4-185 
94 Telephone conversation with M. Wilcox, July 23, 2002 
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complement should be no more than 187 employees... a 500 employee difference, unless 
positions have been added in the remaining sections of the Branch. 
With devolution of the Ministry's land ambulance services occurring at various times 
during 2000, a more forgiving estimate would leave these employees with the Branch 
until the end of the year (nine months into the 2000-2001 fiscal year). 75% (nine-
twelfths) of the annual mean wage for the year is $38,633. When multiplied by the 
number of staff ultimately devolved (641), those staff represent $24.8 million in wages, 
leaving $10.6 million in annual wages for the staff remaining at the Branch. When this 
$10.6 million is divided by the mean wage for the full year ($51,510), a calculated 
complement of approximately 206 employees remains. This represents a calculated 
increase of 19 employees ($978,690) despite the devolution of responsibility for at least 
641 staff members to municipalities. 
There are obviously numerous areas where the accuracy of this modelling can be 
challenged. To most accurately represent the effect on Emergency Health Services 
Branch, true staffing levels by operational section of the Branch are necessary. The 
Ministry's marginal release of information does not match anecdotal and other 
information available. The union representing OPS staff, released information that "more 
than 100 OPSEU members face(d) layoff as a result of the privatization" of Ministry air 
ambulance operations95. OPSEU further estimated the cost of legislated severance for 
95 Privatized air ambulance will "Walkertonize" the skies, OPSEU says 
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"classified" (full-time permanent) air ambulance staff at approximately $1.6 million.96 
Further details are necessary to factor in severance for the 641 devolved land ambulance 
staff that the Ministry admits to. 
Another issue of concern is the effect of the industry's strong part-time staffing 
contingent on Ministry numbers. While all staff numbers presented have been assumed 
to be full-time equivalents, there is no confirmation of this. Our modelling appears to 
indicate slightly more than 200 employees remaining at the Branch, yet anecdotal 
information from CACC staff, indicates their understanding that there are over 300 staff 
employed in dispatch operations alone. The recent IBI "External Review of Hamilton 
CACC" appears to support this with its description of approved staffing complements for 
three of the Ministry's eleven dispatch centres: Hamilton97, Barrie98, and London" 
totalling 91 FTEs. Even if the eight remaining CACCs averaged only 15 FTEs each, this 
would still amount to an additional 120 FTEs for a total of 211 staff assigned to CACCs 
alone. Obviously, clarification is necessary. 
Unfortunately, with only minimal information provided by the Ministry, a truly accurate 
picture cannot be assured. With the information available to us, it does appear that the 
# Ibid, Pg. C-6 
96 Air Ambulance Fact Sheet #1 
97 External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 23 
98 
99 Ibid, Pg. C-8 
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annual cost of providing provincial ambulance service has almost doubled (97% increase) 
since the last year of full Ministry control. It also appears that despite the devolution of 
hundreds of paramedics and support staff as well as all land ambulance operational 
responsibilities to municipalities, the now primarily administrative Branch continues to 
grow significantly. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has documented the transition of ambulance services from provincial to 
municipal control, described the effects of this devolution on municipalities and the 
provincial Emergency Health Services Branch, and compared direct delivery operations 
(^ to those of contracted providers. But did this devolution fulfill the "Who Does What" 
objectives originally set out? Did it result in a more efficient, accountable, less costly and 
simplified government that saved taxpayers money, while sorting out which level of 
government should best deliver ambulance service? 
I think not. Although the service was definitely under-resourced historically based on call 
volume growth, and has had service levels increased dramatically since 1998,100 the cost 
of providing ambulance service in Ontario has almost doubled since devolution to 
municipalities. The EHS bureaucracy continues to grow despite a loss of most 
operational responsibilities. Rather than clearly devolving responsibilities, many have 
become duplicate efforts between the municipalities and the Province. Local 
100 23% increase in hours provided in our sample shown at Appendix VI 
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accountability has improved for some aspects of the service, but become more confused 
for others. There is certainly not one level of government responsible for spending 
decisions and funding responsibility. 
Subsidiarity is the principle that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, 
performing only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more local level101... the view 
that public services are most efficiently and effectively delivered by the most local level 
of government capable of providing them. Emergency services have typically been seen 
as worthy of the most local control possible. Police Services Boards and the insistence of 
local municipalities to maintain control of fire departments, are two very significant 
r^ examples. The understanding of unique local needs and priorities, being able to address 
them without regard for the provincial "flavour of the month", yet being fully accountable 
through locally elected officials, enhances the provision of all local emergency services. 
Yet, in an unpublished draft, Sancton suggests a difference in public opinion when it 
comes to municipal ambulance services: 
many people view health as a provincial responsibility and fire as municipal. 
Such people would not support municipalities taking over ambulance if the 
result were that poorer areas of the province would be forced to reduce 
their own levels of service. This problem could be overcome by high levels 
of provincial funding and regulation, although the argument would then be 
that such provincial involvement would mean an excessively entangled 
system the accountability of which would be insufficiently clear.162 
101 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998, Pg. 1851 
102 Chapter 8 - Emergency Services - Unpublished Draft 
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As described throughout the paper, this is exactly what has happened in Ontario. What 
was needed was a mechanism to add elements of openness, local accountability, control 
and flexibility to the existing provincial ambulance system. But instead of admitting and 
addressing weaknesses in the system and regional disparities in funding and service 
levels, the Ministry chose to challenge the documented needs, control the funding and 
hide behind their own statistics until release was forced. They chose a similar controlling 
tactic with their refusal to provide what should have been public information for this 
paper. 
The devolution of ambulance services to municipal control was a political decision, then 
and now strenuously opposed by the bureaucrats in EHS. What may have started as a 
means to fill part of the education tax gap, served to expose the provincial ambulance 
system as seriously under-resourced and struggling under province-wide increases in both 
emergency calls and non-emergency transfers as the population both ages and ails. 
Rather than being a key partner in the province's rationalization of hospital services 
through timely movement of patients to tertiary care and diagnostic facilities, the existing 
ambulance system is often the main culprit in missed appointments, failure to free up 
acute care hospital beds, and the inability to admit Emergency Department patients to 
hospital. This failure to provide routine transportation needs, ultimately prevents 
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ambulances from offloading patients requiring emergency care at hospital... A giant 
transportation "merry-go-round" affecting the most basic abilities of the health care 
system to function the way it must. 
Municipalities have been forced to address local EMS needs in ways never previously 
attemped by the Ministry. Significant municipal resources have been added in an attempt 
to reduce response times and meet new provincially set standards. But when it was 
identified that their own CACCs were not operating up to similar standards, the Ministry 
simply removed any reference to the dispatch standard from legislation. Improving 
dispatch through updated technology and appropriate staffing was, and still is, an 
excellent and cost-effective means of improving system-wide response times. 
Municipal political pressure to add advanced care paramedics, has overridden the 
province's view of this high level of patient care as but an "experiment". Where wage 
scales were once tightly controlled, the marketplace has now determined wages based on 
tight supply and high demand. This has divided the province into "have" and "have not" 
regions with regards to ambulance service. We are seeing the beginnings of this division 
with our current northern paramedic shortages. Where a seamless system across 
municipal boundaries once existed, there are now concerns about using one's own highly 
valued resources to service a neighbouring under-resourced municipality. Maintaining 
the seamless nature of a provincial ambulance system will be a significant challenge in 
f the future. 
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The guiding principles for the devolution of ambulance services were intended to 
maintain a system that was at once Accessible, Integrated, Seamless, Accountable and 
Responsive. Unfortunately, what has been gained in local accountability and 
responsiveness, has been lost in reduced accessibility, health system integration and 
seamlessness. Residents of "have" municipalities will continue to benefit from the 
devolution as their service needs are identified and service levels improved. "Have not" 
municipalities however, will continue to view EMS as an unwanted downloading and 
maintain the same substandard service levels as before. The issue now will be finding 
and affording the paramedics needed to provide even this level of service. 
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APPENDIX I -Distribution of Ambulance Service Delivery Models 
by Land Ambulance Service Area, 
Effective July, 2002 
0 
City of Cornwall (for The United Counties 
of Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry) 
City of Greater Sudbury 
City of Hamilton 
City of Kawartha Lakes 
City of Ottawa 
City of Toronto 
County of Brant 
County of Bruce 
County of DufTerin 
County of Elgin 
County of Essex/City of Windsor 
County of Frontenac 
County of Grey 
County of Haldimand 
County of Haliburton 
County of Hastings 
County of Huron 
County of Lambton 
County of Lanark 
County of Leeds and Grenville 
County of Lennox and Addington 
County of Middlesex 
County of Norfolk 
County of Northumberland 
County of Oxford 
County of Perth 
County of Peterborough 
County of Prince Edward 
County of Renfrew 
County of Simcoe 
County of Wellington 
United Counties of Prescott and Russell 
District of Algoma 
District of Cochrane 
Direct 
Direct 
Direct 
Contract (Direct Delivery as of January 1, 
2003) 
Direct 
Direct 
Direct 
Direct 
Contract 
Contract 
Direct (1), Contract (3) 
Contract 
Contract 
Direct 
Direct 
Contract (Direct Delivery as of January 1, 
2003) 
Direct 
Direct 
Contract 
Direct 
Contract 
Contract 
Direct 
Contract 
Direct 
Direct 
Direct 
Contract 
Contract 
Contract 
Contract 
Direct 
DSSAB - Direct 
DSSAB - Direct (1), Contract (6) (All Direct 
when existing contracts expire) 
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District of Kenora 
District of Manitoulin/Sudbury 
District of Muskoka 
District of Nipissing 
District of Rainy River 
District of Sault Ste. Marie 
District of Thunder Bay 
District of Timiskaming 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent 
Town of Parry Sound 
Region of Durham 
Region of Halton 
Region of Niagara 
Region of Peel 
Region of Waterloo 
Region of York 
103 
DSSAB - Direct 
DSSAB - Contract (3) 
Contract 
DSSAB - Contract 
DSSAB - Contract (2) 
DSSAB - Contract 
Direct (1), Contract (5) (All Direct as of 
January 1,2003) 
DSSAB - Contract (3) 
Contract 
Contract (3) 
Direct 
Direct 
Contract 
Contract (2) 
Direct 
Direct 
103 Compiled from EMS Municipal Organizational Chart - Association of Municipal Emergency Medical 
Services of Ontario, July, 2002, Emergency Healtli Services Branch Directory of Ambulance System Services, 
February 27, 2002, and EMS Service Delivery Corporate Report 2002.159, City of Thunder Bay, May 17, 2002 
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APPENDIX II - Emergency Health Services Branch Expenditures by Fiscal Year 
70 
Figure 11-1: EHS Expenditures by Fiscal Year 
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APPENDIX III - EHS Transfer Payments to Regional Municipality of Waterloo 
Ambulance Services 
Table DI-1 
* Cambridge Memorial Hospital 
** Kitchener Waterloo Regional Ambulance (1987) Inc. 
*** Base Hospital T/P calculated by year-end CMH ambulance service actuals subtracted from total CMH EHS transfer 
payment 
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Table III-2 
** 
Cambridge Memorial Hospital EMS budget only 
Based on nine months of 1997/98 budget, calendarized 
*** Kitchener Waterloo Regional Ambulance (1987) Inc. budget only 
**** Includes Med-Lift and administration costs 
Table IV-1 
APPENDIX IV - Provincial EHS Annual Statistics 
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Table IV-2 
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Figure IV-1: Provincial Call Volume 
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Figure IV-2: EHS Expenditures Per Call and Resident 
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APPENDIX V - Expenditures and Performance Indicators by Sample Municipalities 
Table V-l 
* Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
** Pg. 15 - Land Ambulance Service Review - Durham, York & Halton (Includes Vehicle and Equipment Replacement 
Costs) 
78 
* Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
** As obtained from the Land Ambulance Services (Essex County, Windsor and Pelee Island) Year 2000 Report - March, 
1999 
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Table V-3 
* Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
** Included volunteer hours 
*** Full Time staffing replaced volunteer hours 
**** 8,760 hours not implemented due to staffing difficulties 
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** 
*** 
Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
Pg. 120 - Land Ambulance Service Review - Southwestern Ontario Municipalities (Includes Vehicle and Equipment 
Replacement Costs) 
Budgeted vehicle hours, but not being provided by the existing Ministry contractor 
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Table V-5 
* Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
** +16,000 hours of overnight standby coverage 
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* Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses 
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APPENDIX VI - 2001-1998 Cost Comparison by Sample Municipalities 
and Provider Type 
84 
Waterloo's call volume increase is artificially lowered due to implementation of "Med-Lift", an alternate non-
emergency patient transportation system, beginning in 1998 (Regionally funded beginning in 1999). By 2001, the 
program was diverting 4,000 low priority calls per year away from ambulance. If "Med-Lift" call volume is 
incorporated, the 2001 over 1998 increase in call volume is 6,023 or 26.8%. 
% increase 2001 by provider type, compared to 1998 for all providers (as all providers were similarly funded and 
controlled by the Ministry). 
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Figure VI-1: Cost per Resident by Upper Tier Municipality 
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Figure VI-2: Cost per Code 1-4 Call by Upper Tier Municipality 
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Figure VI-3: Cost per Code 1-4+8 Call by Upper Tier Municipality 
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APPENDIX VII - Classified Service by Salary Intervals 
(As adopted from Civil Service Commission Annual Report 1999-2000) 
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APPENDIX Vffl - GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ALS Advanced Life Support... The advanced level of care provided by 
Paramedics equipped with at a minimum, defibrillators and 
symptom relief medications 
ACP Advanced Care Paramedic... The highest level of training for land 
ambulance paramedics in Ontario. Requires graduation from a 
two-year Community College program in Paramedicine, plus post 
graduate training to the Advanced Care level, and provincial 
certification as an Advanced Care Paramedic. 
AMO The Association of Municipalities of Ontario. 
ARIS Ambulance Response Information System... The combination of 
computer hardware and software used in Ontario for Computer 
Aided Dispatch and retrieval of dispatch record data. 
AVL Automated Vehicle Locating... A method of using satellites and 
cellular technology to automatically track ambulances, enabling 
dispatchers to select the nearest ambulance to a call. 
Base Hospital 
BLS 
CACC 
CAD 
CMR 
An area hospital assigned and funded by the Ministry of Health to 
provide advanced level training and quality assurance programs for 
local ambulance services. The Base Hospital Medical Director 
delegates medical acts to be performed by area paramedics under 
the auspices of his/her medical licence. 
Basic Life Support... The basic level of first aid and CPR provided 
by ambulance officers or firefighters not trained to the PCP or ACP 
level. 
Central Ambulance Communications Centre... One of nineteen 
land ambulance dispatch centres in the Province, operated by/for 
the Ministry of Health. 
Computer Aided Dispatch technologies. 
Canadian Medical Response... The now defunct division of 
Laidlaw, which attempted to consolidate Ontario's private 
ambulance services in a manner similar to their actions in the U.S. 
CMSM Consolidated Municipal Services Manager. 
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DDA 
Dispatch Interval 
DSSAB 
EHS 
EMS 
Designated Delivery Agent for ambulance services when an Upper 
Tier Municipality is not in place. 
Dispatch Codes The priority assigned to a call by a CACC communicator: 
Code-1 Deferrable Non-Emergency Call (e.g., Return to a 
Nursing Home) 
Code-2 Scheduled Non-Emergency Call (e.g., Medical 
Appointment scheduled for a set time) 
Code-3 Urgent but Non-Life Threatening Emergency Call 
(e.g., Back Injury, Fractured Leg, Abdominal Pain) 
Code-4 Emergency - Life Threatening Emergency Call (e.g., 
Shortness of Breath, Cardiac Arrest) 
Code-8 Standby for Emergency Coverage when area 
ambulance is occupied on another call 
FTE 
The amount of time the CACC takes to priorize a call and then 
accurately select and alert an ambulance crew. Standards require 
this interval to be less than 2 minutes, 90% of the time for Code-4 
calls. 
District Social Services Administration Board... Agencies 
responsible for delivery of ambulance services (and other human 
services) in most of Northern Ontario. 
Emergency Health Services... The Branch of the Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care responsible for ambulance services in 
Ontario. 
Emergency Medical Services... The general term for the network of 
trained health care practitioners, equipment and procedures that 
responds to medical emergencies in the community, and provides 
pre-hospital care and transportation services as required. 
Full Time Equivalent... Hours of staffing equivalent to those 
worked by a full-time employee. 
GTA The Greater Toronto Area. 
JE 
LAISC 
LATT 
0 
LSR 
OAOA 
OHA 
OPALS 
OPS 
OPSEU 
PCP 
Symptom Relief 
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Job Evaluation... The process used by many municipalities to 
compare wages paid with responsibilities required, across various 
job classifications. 
Land Ambulance Implementation Steering Committee... A joint 
committee of AMO and its representatives, the Ministry of Health, 
and senior political representatives, that advises the Minister of 
Health on ambulance transition issues. 
Land Ambulance Transition Taskforce... The original broad 
stakeholder group assembled to review the revised ambulance 
legislation and develop appropriate transition principles and 
guidelines. 
Local Services Realignment initiative of the Harris government. 
Ontario Ambulance Operators' Association... Now defunct. The 
primary group representing private ambulance operators in the 
province prior to devolution. 
The Ontario Hospital Association. 
Ontario Pre-hospital Advanced Life Support study... A Ministry of 
Health funded pilot project investigating the benefits of adding 
Advanced Care Paramedics to selected urban municipalities across 
Ontario. 
The Ontario Public Service. 
The Ontario Public Service Employees Union which now 
represents CACC communicators, but once represented all OPS 
land and air ambulance paramedics. 
Primary Care Paramedic... The minimum level of training for full-
time employment in Ontario ambulance services. Requires 
successful completion of a two year community college program in 
Paramedicine, and provincial certification as an Advanced EMCA. 
The program that allows Primary Care Paramedics to check blood 
sugar levels, administer ASA, Epinephrine, Glucose Gel, 
Glucogon, Nitroglycerine and Ventolin. 
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Time Stamps The essential time elements of a given call, as recorded 
electronically in ARIS by the CACC communicator: 
Time-0 Initial contact with the caller and first keystrokes by 
the CACC call taker. 
Time-1 Confirmation of address and assignment of Call 
Priority which allows the call to be electronically 
transferred to a CACC dispatcher. 
Time-2 Selected ambulance crew notified by base page, 
radio or telephone. 
Time-3 Ambulance crew notifies CACC that it is enroute to 
the scene of the call. 
Time-4 Ambulance arrives at the scene. 
Time-5 Ambulance departs the scene for hospital. 
Time-6 Ambulance arrives at the hospital. 
Time-7 Ambulance clears the hospital for another 
assignment or to return to base. 
Time-8 Ambulance returns to base. 
UTM An Upper Tier Municipality... Either a County, Region or selected 
District/City. 
WDW The "Who Does What" initiative 
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